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Humanitarian intervention has always played an important part in international relations. States intervene to
promote justice, to advance their own interests, or both-but usually call on justice first in justifying their actions.
Even the most extreme apostle of sovereignty, Jean Bodin,
conceded that one sovereign may intervene to punish another who governs without regard to the public welfare,
honor, or survival. (Jean Bodin, Six livres de la Ripublique
(1583 edition) Book II, ch. 5, p. 609). Some level of interference by governments or individuals to prevent the
human rights abuses of others must be tolerated in any
case, whatever one's views, for the same reason that some
interference with others must always be legitimate under
any legal system: because it cannot be totally avoided.
Any action by a state, individual, group of states or group
of individuals will have an effect on others, and to that
extent interfere with them. The question for lawyers and
philosophers cannot be whether intervention is legitimate
(because a total prohibition on interference would preclude all action) but rather when intervention is legitimate
and when it is not. Law sets limits on how much one
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person, group of persons, state or group of states may intervene to influence others, and establishes procedures to
support official interventions (enforcement), or to prevent
improper interventions (delicts or crimes). Some level of
interference must be tolerated because all action is
intervention, and total inaction would not be practical.
Philosophers and lawyers such as Jianming Shen who
have sought to limit "intervention" by one person or state
in.the "internal affairs" of others are not engaged so much
in promoting a prohibition as in drawing a line - the line
between what will count as forbidden "intervention" and
what will not. Those actions of a state that we view as
"internal" (or "private", when speaking of individuals) will
be protected from "intervention" or outside scrutiny.
Those that we choose to count as "external" (or "public")
will not. When the Charter of the United Nations discourages United Nations intervention "in matters which
are essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of any
State" (Art. 2.7), the protected zone extends only so far as
our conception of the state's "domestic jurisdiction",
however we choose to define it.
Theories of law provide definitions for terms such as
"intervention" and "domestic jurisdiction" that practice
and treaties leave vague., Like all law, international law
claims to deserve obedience, which (like all law) international law actually deserves only to the extent that it is
just, or at least more just than the available alternatives.
Most legal systems have a legislature to make laws, courts
to interpret them, and systems of enforcement to make
their laws effective. But international law finds its content
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primarily in considering what would be just, and its obedience primarily in convincing states that international law
is just, and deserves to be obeyed. Drawing the line between a state's protected "domestic jurisdiction" and its
unprotected "human rights violations" depends largely on
what would be just, and which line captures justice best.
SOVEREIGNTY

The "sovereignty" of states, like the "liberty" of citizens,
is the bundle of rights that all states deserve as members of
the international community. The United Nations Charter (to give one recent example) begins with the fundamental principle of "sovereign equality" among its members (Art. 2.1). This implies that members shall settle
their disputes by "peaceful means" (in accordance with
justice) (Art. 2.3) and refrain from "the threat or use of
force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any State" (Art. 2.4).
Later United Nations
documents such as the 1970 General Assembly Declaration on Principles of International Law Concerning
Friendly Relations and Cooperation Among States reaffirm the basic importance of the sovereign equality of
states, based on the principle of "equal rights and selfdetermination of peoples", as established by the Charter
(Art. 1.2) and customary international law.
The Declaration on Friendly Relations illustrates the
process by which governments justify their power under
international law, by connecting their national "sovereignty" to indisputable moral truths. The Preamble to the
Charter of the United Nations declares the "equal rights
INTERNATIONAL LEGAL THEORY.
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of men and women and of nations large and small." All
men and women deserve equal rights, and therefore so do
the nations into which they have associated themselves.
From this it follows that the "peoples" of these nations
should develop mutually "friendly relations", on the basis
of their "equal rights and self-determination". (U.N.
Charter Art. 1.2). Peoples deserve equal rights because
people deserve equal rights. The Declaration on Friendly
Relations "bear[s] in mind" the values of "freedom, equality, justice, ... respect for fundamental human rights",

and the "rule of law" (Preamble) while asserting a norm of
non-intervention "in the affairs of any other state" (First
"Convinced" clause). This juxtaposition is designed to
imply that the two principles are inseparable.
The Declaration on Friendly Relations goes on to denounce any form of "coercion" aimed at the "political
independence or territorial integrity" of any state, (Third
"Recalling" clause) as being (by implication) contrary to
the state's "sovereign equality" ("Reaffirming" clause).
The Declaration strengthens the Charter's prohibition on
the "use of force" by forbidding "political" or "economic"
coercion. States should not be "coerced", because their
peoples deserve "freedom and independence" (Declaration
on Friendly Relations, explaining the First Principle).
The Declaration on Friendly Relations properly criticizes
"the subjection of peoples to alien subjugation, domination and exploitation" (Second "Convinced" clause),
while prohibiting intervention "directly or indirectly, for
any reason whatever, in the internal or external affairs of
any other State" (explaining the Third Principle).

(70]
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NON-INTERVENTION

The Declaration of Friendly Relations provides a useful
starting point for discussing the international norm
against intervention, because the Declaration on Friendly
Relations constructs the most extreme recognized elaboration of the non-intervention norm. The Declaration prohibits even "indirect" intervention "for any reason whatever" in any "affairs" of state. Yet in order to justify this
standard, and to secure compliance from states, even the
Declaration on Friendly Relations must relate nonintervention to "liberty", to "justice", and to "fundamental human rights". The Declaration must condemn "subjugation, domination and exploitation" and maintain the
"equal rights and self-determination of peoples". These
qualifications help to clarify what will count as "intervention" and which are properly a state's own internal "affairs" for the purposes of international law. Violations of
liberty, justice and fundamental human rights, or other
subjugation, domination and exploitation of a people, or
the denial of the rule of law or of a people's right to selfdetermination, cannot fall within the zone of a government's private affairs that are protected against inter-state
"intervention",
because
sovereignty
and
selfdetermination themselves cannot be justified as law, without reference to the universal principles of nondomination and fundamental human rights.
The Institute of International Law recognized the borders of states' protected "affairs" and the limits of their
inviolable "domestic jurisdiction" in its resolution on "La
protection des droits de l'homme et le principe de nonintervention dans les affaires intrieures des Etats",
INTERNATIONAL LEGAL THEORY.
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adopted on the thirteenth of September, 1989 at Santiago
de Compostela. The .Institute considered that human
rights, having been given international protection in the
Charter of the United Nations and other charters and
constituent instruments of international organizations,
and commonly understood as including the rights described in the United Nations General Assembly's Universal Declaration of Human Rights of December 10, 1948,
are therefore legally subject to "international protection"
and not "matters essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of states" (Preamble).
The resolution of the Institute of International Law is
not important so much as an authoritative statement of
international law (although it is very good evidence of
widely-accepted principles), as it is as a clear illustration of
the reasoning that supports the international legal order.
Although "intervention" in a state's domestic "affairs"
would be improper, "measures" taken in response to violations of international human rights law are perfectly
acceptable and indeed sometimes required by each state's
duty of international solidarity in defense of human dignity throughout the world. Under ordinary international
law, as it has existed for centuries, states are entitled to
take diplomatic, economic and other "measures", individually and collectively, against states that have violated
their international obligations. Legitimate countermeasures in the form of retorsion or reprisals are not forbidden "intervention" under international law (Art. 2).

[72]
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HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION

Humanitarian "intervention" (to use the word in its ordinary sense) is not prohibited international "intervention" (in'the legal sense) becauge it does not trespass on a
state's protected "affairs". The Institute of International
Law recognized human rights as a direct expression of the
dignity of the human person, and therefore the subject of
each state's erga omnes obligation to every other state, so
that "every state has a legal interest in the protection of
human rights" everywhere. The Institute referred to the
"duty of solidarity among all states to ensure as rapidly as
possible the effective protection of human rights throughout the world," (Art. 1) and noted that a "state acting in
breach' of its obligations in the sphere of human rights
cannot evade its international responsibility by claiming
that such matters are essentially within its domestic jurisdiction." (Art. 2)
.Human rights violations cannot be considered as essentially within a state's domestic jurisdiction, because doing
so would discredit the underlying concept of "domestic
jurisdiction" 'in international law. States exist, according
to the theory of international law advanced by the United
Nations Charter, to secure economic, social and cultural
advances, to guarantee human rights and fundamental
freedoms, and to implement national self-determination
(U.N. Charter, Art. 1). Releasing states from these obligations would undermine the foundations of their' sovereignty, by discrediting the concepts of freedom and
autonomy on which state sovereignty depends. Without
individual rights there can be no states' rights. Govern-
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ments deserve deference only to the extent that they serve
the common good of all the citizens subject to their rule.
Humanitarian intercession cannot be prohibited "intervention" in a state's internal "affairs", because human
rights violations are never wholly "internal" or "private" in
the necessary sense of those words. This does not justify
indiscriminate or excessive humanitarian countermeasures
to correct all human rights violations, whatever the circumstances. Like all other international measures, humanitarian countermeasures must be proportionate to the
gravity of the violation, taking into account the interests
of individuals and of third states, and all of the relevant
circumstances (Cf. Resolution of Santiago de Compostela,
Articles 2 and 4). The proper limits on humanitarian
intervention to enforce international law against human
rights violations depend less on the limits of "intervention" and "domestic affairs" (since human rights are never
purely domestic) than they do on questions of proportionality, objectivity and enforcement.
ENFORCEMENT

Measures or countermeasures against human rights violations may sometimes be justified as necessary for the
enforcement of international law. But not all enforcement measures are justified. Different responses will be
appropriate to different violations, and some violations
will have to go unpunished when no appropriate remedy
can be found. The International Law Commission's
Draft Articles on State Responsibility suggest some of the
limits to measures that states may take in response to
[74]
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other states' violations of international law (or of obligations that "may be owed to another State, to several
States, or to the international community as a whole" Draft Art. 34). In their current form, the Draft Articles
would preclude the threat or use of force in countermeasures "in a manner contrary to the Charter of the United
Nations", or other measures in violation of fundamental
human rights; in violation of humanitarian law; in violation of peremptory norms of general international law; or
in violation of diplomatic inviolability (Draft Art. 52).
The Draft Articles on State Responsibility recognize
that countermeasures "must be commensurate with the
injury suffered, taking into account the gravity of the internationally wrongful act and the rights in question".
(Draft Article 52) This reflects the obvious truth that the
punishment should fit the crime, but also raises pervasive
problems of judgment in enforcing international law.
Sanctions against human rights violations will have negative effects, not only on the governments that have violated international law, but also on the subjects that they
rule. Military interventions will often hurt oppressed
peoples. Economic sanctions almost always harm citizens
far more than their oppressive governments. Indeed,
rights-violating regimes often profit (as in Yugoslavia and
Iraq) from economic sanctions, while their peoples starve.
The notion that subjects are in some sense collectively
responsible for their government's violations of international law is particularly ill-considered in the case of human rights violations, when the citizens themselves are
victims of the state. In such cases swift overwhelming
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military interventions may- be -more justified than drawnout economic sanctions, so long as military interventions
act quickly to restore or to establish democratic institutions and respect for international law. The less democratic the government that violates human rights, the less
appropriate economic sanctions will be for enforcing international law. Sanctions were more appropriate (for
example) against Serbia, whose people were united in oppressing ethnic minorities, than against Iraq, whose dictator never enjoyed popular support.
OBJECTIVITY

The examples of Serbia and Iraq, whose- governments
suffered for violating international law, while other
equally culpable governments in Russia and' China (for
example) did not, raise the question of objectivity in humanitarian interventions. Large powerful states that violate international law do not face the same levels of enforcement that smaller weaker states do. Small weak
states can seldom act to prevent human rights violations
from occurring elsewhere. Large powerful states sometimes intervehe. This raises two problems of objectivity.
First, the problem of impunity, because the large states are
immune from serious punishment. Second, -the problem
of poor judgment, when powerful states act alone. Given
the absence of any legitimate international government,
enforcement of international law will necessarily be partial, uneven, and favor the strong.
Some scholars suggest that defacto impunity for strong
governments justifies an equal impunity for the weak, but
[76]
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this does not follow. Punishing weak oppressors establishes principles that also apply to the strong, and may
sometimes be enforced against them. The problem of
poor judgment raises greater difficulties. Powerful states
may make mistakes, or use human rights as pretence to
dominate their neighbors. Given the erga omnes nature of
human rights violations (Barcelona Traction) and every
state's right to respond proportionately to violations of
international human rights law, states must be constrained
so that they judge violations and impose their sanctions
correctly.
The test of veracity in international law is consensus.
The greater the consensus, the greater the likelihood of
truth. Like other foundational doctrines of international
law, this doctrine of legal epistemology rests on the
enlightened premise that people (and peoples) everywhere
possess reason. If international law consists of rules of
conduct deduced by reason from the nature of the society
of nations (Wheaton, Elements I § 14), then consensus
clarifies the dictates of reason, and consent may modify
them, in certain circumstances. This doctrine has two
implications: first, that governments may act with greater
certainty in enforcing international law when other governments agree with their judgments - multilateral decision-making is more accurate than unilateral action; second, that the views of non-democratic governments count
for less in establishing the requirements of international
law. Non-democracies speak only for their rulers, and not
for the captive subjects of their power.
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THE USE OF FORCE

"Intervention" in its strongest sense implies the use of
force, which has a special status under the United Nations
Charter. In Article 2, section 4 of the Charter, the members of the United Nations renounce "the threat or use of
force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any State, or in any other manner inconsistent
with the Purposes of the United Nations". This language
would seem to imply that the use of force consistent with
the purposes of the United Nations would be acceptable
(Article I purposes include protecting human rights and
the self-determination of peoples) but the Charter also
puts the use of force into a special category, as being inherently threatening to international peace and security,
and contrary to the principle that disputes should be settled by "peaceful means" (Article I § 1).
Reason and the nature of the society of nations indicate
that force should be avoided as much as possible in resolving international disputes. The members of the Institute
of International Law discouraged "the use of armed force
in violation of the Charter of the United Nations" to enforce international human rights law (Resolution of Santiago de Compostela, Article 2). The Third Restatement of
Foreign Relations Law endorses "all remedies generally
available for violation of an international agreement" (§
703 (1)), but limits its conception of human rights enforcement to states that have exhibited "a consistent pattern of gross violations" of international human rights (§
702 (g)). The Draft Articles on State Responsibility restricts its discussion of erga omnes violations to "serious
breaches" involving "gross or systematic" harm (Draft
[78]
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article 41), and provides that countermeasures shall not
involve any derogation from the "obligation to refrain
from the threat or use of force as embodied in the Charter" (Draft Article 51 (1)(a)).
The United Nations Charter offers a mechanism
through the Security Council for coordinating "measures"
to be taken to maintain or to restore international peace
and security (Article 39), which may extend to enforcing
human rights norms, to the extent that such violations
threaten international peace and security. The General
Assembly of the United Nations also provides a vehicle
through which states can reach consensus about the maintenance of international peace and security, and may
make recommendations (Article 11 (1)), as the General
Assembly did to encourage intervention against the "subjugation, domination and exploitation" of colonialism
(Declaration on Friendly Relations; Declaration on the
Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples). Not all human rights violations necessarily threaten
international peace and security, however, and the United
Nations is not the only instrument for enforcing international law. The long-established practice of bilateral enforcement by military force remains available in response
to serious and systematic violations of humans rights law,
such as slavery and genocide.
HUMILITY

The guiding principle in determining the existence of
and proper response to human rights violations under
international law should be humility on the part of the
INTERNATIONAL LEGAL THEORY - Volume
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governments involved. Those with the power to intervene or take measures to enforce international law should
act with humility, understanding the limits of their objectivity and judgment. The chance of mistake and the costs
of intervention favor overlooking minor or anomalous
violations of human rights law. Even serious or systematic violations should be studied with care, and due deference to the judgment of others. Sometimes the costs of
humanitarian intervention will outweigh the benefits to
those oppressed.
Humility in judging violations encourages democratic
techniques in assessing the need for humanitarian interventions. Deference to the opinions of others requires
consultation and real deliberation. The actual structure of
existing international institutions, such as the United Nations and the International Court of Justice, gives undue
weight to the views of repressive governments, including
many human rights violators and non-democracies. Consultation and deliberation become difficult and less reliable when governments shut their peoples out from the
discussion. Non-democratic governments have no way of
judging or constraining their own judgments of illegality,
and therefore no valid basis for engaging in humanitarian
intervention, except in cooperation with democratic
states. Democratic states should seek the views of other
democracies, and above all the perceptions of those on
whose behalf they seek to intervene, before taking action.
The actual views of those oppressed carry particular
weight in contemplating the method of enforcement,
whether by arms, economic sanctions, or simple criticism

[80]
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of the oppressive regime. The enforcement of human
rights law protects the interest in human dignity that all
states owe to all others, but also shields particular individuals against particular harms. Humility requires not
only that states should question their own judgments of
harm, but also that they should measure their own interest in human dignity against the more direct sufferings of
individual persons. When humanitarian intervention will
harm its supposed beneficiaries too much, or against their
wishes, it may no longer be justified.
CONCLUSION

States will act to prevent human rights violations for the
same reasons that people have always acted against injustice. These include sympathy for the victims, fear of the
perpetrators, and the general desire to establish just legal
principles by enforcing them against violators. Legal action against human rights violations may be as trivial as
verbal criticism, or as serious as armed intervention: The
appropriate level of response* depends on the circumstances. Nations deserve a zone of sovereignty or "domestic jurisdiction" within which to develop their own histories and cultures, but governments should never have and
do not deserve a license to oppress or to exploit the peoples subject to their power. The sovereign rights of states
derive from the human rights of individuals. Governments that deny human rights are violating international
law.
The principle of non-intervention in the internalaffairs
of states does not extend to protect human rights violaINTERNATIONAL LEGAL THEORY. Volume
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tors, because human rights violations concern all human
beings. To forbid humanitarian intervention would discredit international law, by denying the fundamental justice on which all law must rest. This does not mean that
enforcement should be indiscriminate or disproportionate, but rather that transgressions should be punished as
fairly and objectively as possible. Sometimes the use of
force will be justified to put an end to serious breaches of
human rights obligations, when gross and systematic violations such as slavery or genocide cannot be prevented in
any other way, but all interference or intervention to enforce human rights should reflect international consensus
after democratic deliberation, and due concern for the
rights of others.
Humanitarian intervention is legitimate under international law whenever serious human rights violations can
be prevented in no other way, so long as the states enforcing international law respect the territorial integrity and
political independence of the peoples that they protect.
All nations have the equal right to self-determination, so
that the people themselves may decide who their rulers
shall be. Governments that deny their peoples human
rights and fundamental freedoms forfeit their right to
rule. The limits of humanitarian intervention depend on
the value of human dignity, the welfare of those oppressed, the objectivity of the enforcers, and their humility in the face of public opinion. As the framers of the
United Nations Charter recognized: states must conform
to the principles of justice and international law, or there
will be no peace. (Cf.Art. 1.1).

[82]

INTERNATIONAL LEGAL THEORY. Summer 2001

